Ad Injection at Scale: Assessing Deceptive Advertisement Modifications
Venue
Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2015)
Publication Year
2015
Authors
Kurt Thomas, Elie Bursztein, Chris Grier, Grant Ho, Nav Jagpal, Alexandros Kapravelos, Damon McCoy, Antonio Nappa, Vern Paxson, Paul Pearce, Niels Provos, Moheeb Abu Rajab
BibTeX
Abstract
Today, web injection manifests in many forms, but fundamentally occurs when
malicious and unwanted actors tamper directly with browser sessions for their own
profit. In this work we illuminate the scope and negative impact of one of these
forms, ad injection, in which users have ads imposed on them in addition to, or
different from, those that websites originally sent them. We develop a multi-staged
pipeline that identifies ad injection in the wild and captures its distribution and
revenue chains. We find that ad injection has entrenched itself as a cross-browser
monetization platform impacting more than 5% of unique daily IP addresses accessing
Google—tens of millions of users around the globe. Injected ads arrive on a
client’s machine through multiple vectors: our measurements identify 50,870 Chrome
extensions and 34,407 Windows binaries, 38% and 17% of which are explicitly
malicious. A small number of software developers support the vast majority of these
injectors who in turn syndicate from the larger ad ecosystem. We have contacted the
Chrome Web Store and the advertisers targeted by ad injectors to alert each of the
deceptive practices involved.