Publication Data
Budget-Constrained Auctions with Heterogeneous Items
Abstract: We present the first approximation algorithms for designing
revenue-optimal incentive-compatible mechanisms in the following setting: There are
multiple (heterogeneous) items, and bidders have arbitrary demand and budget
constraints (and additive valuations). Furthermore, the type of a bidder (which
specifies her valuations for each item) is private knowledge, and the types of different
bidders are drawn from publicly known mutually independent distributions. Our
mechanisms are surprisingly simple. First, we assume that the type of each bidder is
drawn from a discrete distribution with polynomially bounded support size. This
restriction on the type-distribution, however, allows the random variables
corresponding to a bidder’s valuations for different items to be arbitrarily
correlated. In this model, we describe a sequential all-pay mechanism that is truthful
in expectation and Bayesian incentive compatible. The outcome of our all-pay mechanism
can be computed in polynomial time, and its revenue is a 4-approximation to the revenue
of the optimal truthful-in-expectation Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism. Next,
we assume that the valuations of each bidder for different items are drawn from
mutually independent discrete distributions satisfying the monotone hazard-rate
condition. In this model, we present a sequential posted-price mechanism that is
universally truthful and incentive compatible in dominant strategies. The outcome of
the mechanism is computable in polynomial time, and its revenue is a O(1)-approximation
to the revenue of the optimal truthful-in-expectation Bayesian incentive-compatible
mechanism. If the monotone hazard-rate condition is removed, then we show a logarithmic
approximation, and we complete the picture by proving that no sequential posted-price
scheme can achieve a sub-logarithmic approximation. Finally, if the distributions are
regular, and if the space of mechanisms is restricted to sequential posted-price
schemes, then we show that there is a O(1)-approximation within this space. Our results
are based on formulating novel LP relaxations for these problems, and developing
generic rounding schemes from first principles.
