Renato Paes Leme

Renato Paes Leme is a research scientist at Google New York. He is broadly interested in algorithm design, specially for problems on the interface between Economics and Computation. Some topics he is particularly excited about are: mechanism design for non-quasi-linear settings, Price of Anarchy of auctions, sequential games and applications of game-theory to ad auctions. See http://renatoppl.com/ for my personal homepage.

Google Publications

Previous Publications

  •  

    Pricing public goods for private sale

    Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme

    Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Eletronic Commerce (EC 2013), pp. 417-434

  •  

    On revenue in the generalized second price auction

    Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Éva Tardos

    Proceedings of the 21st International World Wide Web Conference (WWW 2012), pp. 361-370

  •  

    Optimal mechanisms for selling information

    Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Renato Paes Leme

    13th ACM Conference on Eletronic Commerce (EC 2012), pp. 92-109

  •  

    Sequential auctions and externalities

    Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos

    Proceedings of the 24rd ACM-SIAM Symposium of Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2013) (2012), pp. 869-886

  •  

    Signaling schemes for revenue maximization

    Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu, Renato Paes Leme, Moshe Tennenholtz

    Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Eletronic Commerce (EC 2012), pp. 514-531

  •  

    The curse of simultaneity

    Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos

    Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science conference (ITCS 2012, pp. 60-67

  •  

    The dining bidder problem: à la russe et à la française

    Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos

    SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 11 (2012), pp. 25-28

  •  

    GSP auctions with correlated types

    Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme

    Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2011), pp. 71-80

  •  

    Pure and Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy for Generalized Second Price Auction

    Renato Paes Leme, Éva Tardos

    Proceedings of the 51st Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2010), pp. 735-744